| Prisoner abuse, and the future of Iraq |
The revelations concerning prisoner abuse in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and the images broadcast world wide have done enormous harm to the moral authority of America, as the leading nation in the coalition.
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In the discussion of these matters, a number of statements have been put forward in qualification:-
- Some of the prisoners themselves had committed vile deeds.
- The prisoner abuse is less bad than some current atrocities committed by Islamists, such as the beheading of an American contractor.
- The prisoner abuse is confined to a small proportion of American soldiers.
- The prisoner abuse is insignificant, compared with the appalling crimes committed by Saddam Hussein and his regime.
- The media has given disproportionate space to this matter, compared with other crimes committed by supporters of Saddam Hussein, before and since his regime was removed.
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All true, and all beside the point. These are separate issues. They should not be used in an attempt to mitigate the offences. They do not excuse, in any way, what took place, which must be dealt with appropriately, and publicly. |
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The report of the investigating officer, Major-General Antonio Taguba, says "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees". His report goes on to give specific details of the crimes of military police personnel, and makes recommendations about training and accountability. |
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The culprits are now before military courts. Those responsible further up the chain of command, who failed to give proper supervision, or perhaps suggested that "ordinary rules do not apply" must be dealt with according to law. |
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| None are incapable |
More unpleasant revelations seem likely. Meanwhile, Anne Applebaum, author of a recent book on the Soviet Gulag, observes that the American soldiers and civilians involved do not belong in the same category as Nazi or Soviet camp guards. "But their actions do prove, if further proof were needed, that no culture is incapable of treating its enemies as sub human". |
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In February 2003, commenting on the impending conflict in Iraq, this journal expressed misgivings about the US plans for reconstructing the country, an opinion widely shared. Of course, it is easy to appear wise from a safe distance. As things have turned out, many mistakes have been made, some of them now publicly admitted by senior US officials. |
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While prisoner abuse and other episodes of violence gain the headlines, the changes taking place in Iraq get little attention. The current upsurge in violence appears directly connected with the imminent transfer of authority to an Iraqi government on June 30, which will have the task of organising elections by the end of January 2005. The reasons for this are fairly clear. A transfer to an Iraqi authority makes it that much harder for the remaining Saddam loyalists who wish to regain power by force. |
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But it goes much further than that. The authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in the neighbourhood are less than comfortable with the prospect of a democratic government in Iraq. If it turns out to be reasonably successful, it sets an example for them. But so far, they have been capable of accommodating themselves to new realities. |
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| Disaster for Islamists |
For Islamist extremists such as Al-Qaeda, it would be a disaster. Their objective is to move entirely in the opposite direction: to fully restore Sharia law in regimes that are at present partly secular, thus re-establishing a pre-mediaeval type of government and society; to remove Western influence from the Middle East, and then to use the resources of those states against the West. However irrational that might seem, that is their vision. |
For a more detailed view on al-Qaeda's objectives in Iraq, see Al-Qaeda's Methodological Model by Trevor Stanley. |
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In preparation for a new Iraqi government, much work has already taken place. The Kurdish leaders in the north, who have demonstrated their ability to run a semi autonomous government, now have the agreement of the Sunni and Shiite Arabs that Iraq should be a federal state, with regional autonomy for the Kurds , the Sunni Arabs in the centre, and the Shiite Arabs in the south. (The Shiites represent 60 percent of the population). That agreement, which took months to put together, is no small achievement. |
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The former British special representative in Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, counterpart to Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, was until recently on the ground in Baghdad. He has provided an interesting analysis of the violence, and the challenges ahead. |
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He says coalition military effectiveness grew over the northern winter, with better intelligence. Saddam loyalists were picked up in increasing numbers, and were finding it harder to communicate with one another. They then turned to developing co-operation with non-Iraqi terrorist groups of the al-Qaeda franchise, who have a different motivation, but agree with the Saddam loyalists about making Iraq ungovernable. "For both, violence and anarchy are to be achieved by indiscriminate killing and disruption". |
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| Violence and anarchy |
Greenstock believes these two groups have no prospect of defeating the coalition in a military sense. They must either try to destroy its political will, or build a larger opposition to it within the Iraqi population. If continued violence causes more resentment by ordinary Iraqis against the occupying powers, that outcome is possible. |
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Since joining forces, as the Americans became harder to attack, these groups changed tactics. They attacked softer targets: other coalition members, civilian contractors, UN officials, employees of NGOs, and members of the new Iraqi structures. Their specific areas of support are at present quite limited: the Sunni extremists around Fallujah, and the militant Shia followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. |
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In Greenstock's view, coalition troops will be required until borders are secure, militias are disarmed and terrorist incidents are the exception. That may be sometime in 2006. He is positive about the prospects of an Iraqi government, saying the country has enough talented and educated citizens. |
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Meanwhile, many other observers have pointed to positive developments. Iraqi women are glad to see the end of Saddam's regime. There is uncensored access to the Internet. Mobile phones are selling well, and Iraqi newspaper and radio stations are growing. There have been elections in 17 municipal councils. Money is pouring into water supply, sanitation, power supply, hospitals. The main problem in reconstruction is the threat of violence to civilian contractors. |
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Many things can go wrong. But the people of Iraq have an opportunity to restore security, to rebuild civil society after 30 years of despotism, and to recreate a prosperous nation. As East Timor's Jose Ramos-Horta observed, those who would cut and run from Iraq risk leaving the innocent to suffer. |
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