| 1. GLOBAL STRATEGIC ISSUES: |
| Iraq and George W. Bush | We don't know whether President Bush will attack Iraq or not. We think it is likely and we think he should, preferably with UN support, and sooner rather than later, even though we are not sure what all his military and political options are. What we do know, however, is that following September 11, America's military capabilities have been growing very rapidly, especially technologically, and that it is perfectly capable, especially with the 'genius' weapons of the time, of easily defeating Iraq's forces and presumably in a short period of time. It is also known that whatever approach and action Bush eventually decides upon, he will want to minimise US casualties - as was achieved in the 1991 Gulf War and Afghanistan. That's good strategy for as von Clausewitz said, war is the continuation of politics by other means, and the ideal is to win without firing a shot. Those people warning the US that an attack on Iraq would result in "disaster" are much the same people - indeed, often the exactly the same people - who told us that the Gulf War - the Mother of All Wars - would see 10,000 US casualties in the first week and that in Afghanistan the US army would be "sucked in and totally destroyed by the brilliant soldiers of the Taliban and al Qa'ida". In our view another US-Iraq war would be likely to be another short war - although settling the peace might be a longer and more difficult task. | |
| 3. INDONESIA |
| The decisions of the recently convened People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to hold direct elections for the Presidency in 2004 and to abolish from that date appointed positions in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the MPR for members of the military (TNI) and other special groups are significant steps toward Indonesian democracy. These developments came as a surprise to many observers as President Megawati and other senior political figures, including members of the MPR, were arguing against them only a short time before the MPR session began. However, the MPR was forced to bow to public pressure as student and NGO demonstrations grew outside the parliament and the media continually demanded reform. It was made very clear to the MPR that if the reforms were thwarted, the demonstrations could get very large and the demonstrators very angry. The effort was also helped by a number of key MPR figures, including the Speaker of the Assembly, Amien Rais, who always believed in direct presidential elections. In another encouraging development, the Assembly voted against a constitutional amendment incorporating the Jakarta Charter into Article 29 of the constitution which has been a consistent aim of the Islamists ( that is, Wahabbist Muslims who believe that religion and politics are co-essential) in their drive for an Islamic State and Sharia Law.
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| TNI | These are significant developments for the military (TNI). It has been clear for a very long time that the military's Dwi Fungsi or Dual Function role was dead in anything like its old sense and that it would gradually withdraw from its parliamentary, political and territorial roles. This is not to say that it would not intervene if, in its view, some national crisis occurred in the near future - for example in the national leadership. But that would be a sort of one-off affair and its capability to do that will, almost certainly, decline over time. Unless something truly extraordinary happens, the military will never return to what it once was in the socio-political arena.
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| In early August, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) issued an Asia Briefing entitled Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia which we believe can best be described as convoluted naivety. While it contains some interesting and valuable detail and nitty-gritty, it fails to understand the nature of guerrilla/terrorist movements or organisations and radical Islamist ones in particular. In fact, the word Islamist is never used, betraying its most important misunderstanding, namely the nature of the totalitarian wahabbist ideological motivations and origins of these movements. It spectacularly fails to understand that what we are dealing with here are in fact totalitarian revolutionary Islamist guerrilla organisations or movements operating on a global field. Like all guerrilla movements, they are a small minority and operate in small groups, fighting by definition many small wars with whatever weapons are at hand, preferably, as Mao emphasised, obtained from the enemy. Their art is concealment, deception and surprise. As revolutionary guerrilla movements, they are at the same time both political and military forces with both political and military objectives (which requires us to meet them in both areas). Indeed, as Islamist forces they are even more than that for Islamists, unlike other Muslims, are theocrats believing that politics and religion are co-essential. The ICG understands little or nothing of this and naively looks for the wrong sort of 'evidence' and 'proof' of the existence of these movements. It tries to paint mental pictures of what organisations like Jemaah Islamiyah might look like. This shows no appreciation at all of what Lawrence of Arabia in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom meant when he described an effective guerrilla movement as "an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas." What is 'evidence' in politics and guerrilla warfare? In the past, we were told that there was no evidence that the North Vietnamese were involved in a South Vietnamese "civil war"; or that there were 300,000 Chinese 'volunteers' in North Vietnam; or for the existence of Ho Chi Minh Trail; or for the existence of the communist NDF in the Philippines - while throughout the nineties warnings that Osama bin Laden, al Qa'ida and their associated terrorist organisations posed a serious threat to the world and the region were dismissed as "nonsense".
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| Floundering | The ICG report similarly flounders when, in the context of these sort or movements, it tries to define terrorism by drawing distinctions between terrorism and other forms of military, guerrilla and criminal activity. In this context, these are distinctions without a difference. It's like trying to distinguish angels on the head of a pin. Or, perhaps, more analogously and equally messy, it is like trying to define gangsterism by drawing distinctions between gangsterism and the godfathers, accountants, car drivers and distillers in the old, nineteen twenties US mafia.
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| More seriously, the ICG accuses the US, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines of "manufacturing" evidence against certain Indonesian Islamist clerics and other Indonesian Islamist Muslim civilian activists. It also seems to be saying that real terrorist/guerrilla organisations are led by military types with weapons constantly at hand and not by intellectuals, teachers, clerics or other 'civilians'. Yet, some of the most famous guerrilla leaders and terrorists in history have been academics, teachers, librarians, writers and poets, among them Vo Nguyen Giap, Souphanouvong, T.E. Lawrence, Ho Chi Minh, Nur Misuari, Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ma Sison, Luis Taruc, and Mao Tse Tung.
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| Strategy of cutting communications | It should be said here that the war against al Qa'ida and other terrorist/ revolutionary guerrilla organisations will involve essentially a strategy of cutting the enemy's communications and destroying his political and military cells and strike forces. There have been strong indications that the Indonesian security authorities understand this and that behind the scenes they are working effectively on the matter in cooperation with their ASEAN and other international allies. We should add - once again - that moderate Indonesian Islamic leaders appreciate the dangers of Islamism and are working to counter it politically and theologically.
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| Shortly after the ICG issued its report, it was revealed (for example, in The Australian, 17/8/2002) that the two al Qa'ida suicide bombers who assassinated the Afghan opposition leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, a few days before September 11, were on their way to Indonesia when Osama bin Laden ordered that they be diverted to the Massoud mission. Who could they have been planning to connect up with Indonesia? And for what purpose? Or were they ultimately going on to somewhere else? Australia perhaps? One of the greatest concerns in Indonesia is that the Vice President of the Republic, Hamzah Haz, who is also the leader of the largest Islamic party the PPP, is sympathetic to the Islamists, if not one himself.
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| 4. AUSTRALIA: |
| Late last month the new Chief of the Australian Defence Force, General Peter Cosgrove, expressed the view that, in hindsight, Australia should not have gone to the Vietnam War. He seemed to be saying that the main reason was that the war could not be won. (We disagree with him on both of these matters and hope to explain why in a future issue). After this statement he gave an interview on ABC Radio in which he said that just as today it can be seen that Vietnam was wrong, in thirty years time it might be seen that what we're doing today is wrong. Who would ever follow such a publicly uncertain general into battle?
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| 5. REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES |
| In recent days, talks have been going on between Japan, Australia and the US in Tokyo and elsewhere with the objective of strengthening the political and security relationships between the three nations. While the immediate focus might be on Islamist terrorist movements, the long term objectives have to do with regional strategic matters and maintaining the regional balance of power. At the same time, negotiations aimed at developing a free trade agreement between Australia and Japan are under way and are expected to continue over the next few months leading up to the first Australia-Japan Council meeting in Tokyo in November. | |
| Generally speaking, all of this is very good and consistent with the regional strategic aims of APEC and ASEAN ARF. Of course, Japan has for years quietly played a strategic naval role in the region and defence relations and co-operation between the three nations have long been good (dating back at least to the late 1960's). However, formalising those relations helps bring Japan further into the comity of Asian nations and more should be done in this respect by eventually widening this grouping to include China and ASEAN - and especially Indonesia, which sits on the pivotal strategic waterways running between the Indian and Pacific Oceans which carry nearly all of the trade and oil between Europe, the Middle East and East Asia and most of Australia's trade. Furthermore, one hopes that the process will involve defence ministers, senior military officers and military strategists as well as the usual foreign policy brigades.
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| Not many people realise that Indonesia and India share a common border - an ocean boundary running between the Indian owned Nicobar Islands and North Sumatra. As the result of an agreement reached last year, the two nations have begun joint naval patrols off the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The patrol,will be conducted by a warship and a patrol aircraft from each navy. An Indian defense ministry statement said it will be jointly led by the commander-in-chief of India's Tri-Service Command headquartered in the Andaman and Nicobar islands and the commander of the Western Fleet Command of the Indonesian Navy.
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| Indian - US Escort Services | India is also providing an escort service for ships passing through the Indian Ocean en route to Southeast and East Asia through the Malacca Straits. The straits are among the busiest sea lanes in the world and the huge quantity of oil passing through it makes it highly vulnerable to terrorist threats. The escort service follows an agreement between the Indian and US navies reached after consultation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia and other regional nations. Under the agreement, escort duties are divided between the Indian and US navies for periods of six months each.
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